Russia on American Coattails

The most significant reduction of U.S. military forces in Europe since World War II, recently announced by President George W. Bush, is a possible windfall for Russia. The Kremlin won't say it, invoking characteristic diplomatic language, but increased American military deployment in Central Asia's "trouble spots" can, in the long run, benefit Russia at a very expensive cost to the United States. In
the short term, both the United States and Russia have common interests in Central Asia -- but fighting Islamic militancy and weapon proliferation in the region may create unexpected outcomes.
The Bush Administration's decision to withdraw 70,000 troops from Europe and Asia, starting in 2006, for redeployment in the United States, the new eastern European members of NATO and Central Asia -- an expected strong military presence in the former republics of the Soviet Union -- has not particularly bothered the Kremlin. Of course, some nationalists were quick to claim "further encirclement" by an aggressive United States. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov, on the other hand, expressed the political establishment's position, "I do not see anything worrying in these plans." Adding, "No grandiose movements are expected."
Beyond the vexing issue (for the Russian side) of a greater NATO military presence in the Baltic republics, Washington and Moscow see very much eye-to-eye on what really matters in today's international environment – fighting international terrorism and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. NATO planes using Lithuania's airspace is a Kremlin public relations public issue (read: wounded pride), but confronting religious fundamentalism in Central Asia and what is now called the "Greater Middle East" are clear and present dangers.
However, in fighting these threats, Washington and Moscow may have very different futures in mind for Central Asia -- while both keep tabs on Iranian and Chinese interests in the region. There appears to be no doubt as to America's
resolve to fight international terrorism and proliferation, irrespective of country or region, but there are doubts as to what kind of world may come about when confronting these threats. When it comes to Central Asia, Russia is banking
on a long-term gambit that will see the United States identifying and hopefully destroying these threats, but, in the process, Russia expects the United States to become an unpopular and unwanted political and military player in the region.
New or enhanced American military presence -- whether it is called a base or mobile military unit -- in such countries as Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan present the United States with a number of political problems. The political elites in Central Asia, to one degree or another, have limited legitimacy in the eyes of the people they rule. Corruption on all levels of government is pervasive, with economic development hardly encouraging. Human rights observance is not a strong suit either. As nation-states, few have created a strong sense of citizenship. In short, Central Asian states are weak and susceptible to radical Islamic appeals, which can create political and social identities Central Asian regimes have never seriously addressed.
The United States needs to consider how closely it intends to associate with these regimes when fighting terrorism and containing weapons proliferation. If not thought out carefully, the United States may be perceived, because of a
high-profile military presence, as strongly allied with unpopular governments in the region. The combination of weak and unpopular regimes and an increased terrorist threat is the worst nightmare for such regimes, which would be caught
in the middle between a military superpower pursuing its international security agenda and restive local populations further dissatisfied with ruling governing elites and a foreign military presence fighting a war on its soil.
This is the scenario the Kremlin most likely expects. The United States is fully expected to enter the region in force in the near future, with the first objective of modernizing Central Asian military and security forces. America may
also achieve a modicum of success in identifying and destroying elements of international terrorism, but political costs will be very high. The country's reputation in the region could become severely tarnished and local regimes
targeted for popular overthrow. This is the set of circumstances in which Russia may intend to reassert of power position in Central Asia -- and in a very big
way. Historically, Russia has never really been welcomed in Central Asia, but it is a country with its attendant mindset that local leaders well understand – local populations included. As independent countries, and former Soviet republics, it is difficult to conceive that they will ever seriously seek long-term protection from a country like the Untied States, when Russia will remain forever near.
Russia has no problem allowing, even helping, the United States to do the heavy lifting against international terrorism and the containment of weapons of mass
destruction in Central Asia, knowing full well that the United States will either want to leave the region at some point or be asked to leave. Russia probably is more than happy to wait out America's mission in Central Asia,
riding on its coattails until the time comes when Central Asia welcomes Russia's well-known embrace.

(Peter Lavelle is an independent Moscow-based analyst and the author of the electronic newsletter on Russia "Untimely Thoughts" untimely-thoughts.com). A short version of this article was published by United Press International. The author graciously thanks Ralph Davis for his comments on the original draft)