On August, 2011 Dr. Alexander Shumilin, Head of the Center for the Greater Middle East conflicts in Moscow, was invited by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation in Japan to hold a number of public lectures on the Russian Policy in the Middle East.
SUMMARY OF THE PRESENTATION -- “THE RUSSIA’S POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST”
Dr.Alexander SHUMILIN
1. We have just marked the 20th anniversary of the failed coup d’etat (August, 1991) which greatly precipitated the collapse of the Soviet Union three monthes later. Those events meant important change of the Moscow policy towards the Middle East -- on October, 1991 we saw restored the SU diplomatic relations with Israel, Moscow started to ease its support to the radical Arab regimes, new goals for the Russian policy there are being defined while the ME area being perceived rather as the point of Russia’s cooperation with the USA than an area of rivalry and even indirect confrontation as it had been before. Russia started to try positioning itself as a trusted country – if not mediator – between the conflicting sides there, including Iran and Saudi Arabia.
2. The turn from rivalry to cooperation with the USA, however, was rather radical but it didn’t undermine the basic principle of Moscow – to perceive the ME issues as derivative from the current state of bilateral US-Russia relations. This mechanism works simply: once the US-Russia’s relations are worsening, the degree of cooperation in the ME is dropping.
3. The events related to the Arab Spring are being perceived in Moscow cautiously -- as well as in the USA. The reason is one – they may lead to some sensitive changes of the political reality in the region. But the Russia’s caution is also explained by the Kremlin concern that such a popular revolt in the authoritarian Arab countries might turn to be contagious and to sweep on Russia itself. Those events are perceived in Russia rather as a kind of Orange Revolutions swept over a number of the Post-Soviet countries before which -- in terms of the Russian leadership – are mostly provoqued and manipulated by the USA and European countries. Actually those revolts are causing the reduction of the Russia’s influence in the ME countries indeed.
4. Meanwhile the real roots of the popular uprisings there are completely of internal nature, engendered strictly by internal reasons and problems of the Arab societies. They may differ from country to another, but their common reason is the lack of the legal political ways as a tool to solve or overcome the problems accumulated in social and economic fields. To be more precise, we were watching manifestations of a crisis of political-social nature and not exactly the habitual socio-political one. That why I prefer to dub the ME events “the revolutions of THREE NO” – NO to a National Leader (YES to an elected President); NO to the Ruling Party (Yes to a Party of the voting majority); NO to the censorship of media.
5. Typologically the revolved Arab countries might be classified as follows:
n Relatively modernized societies (Tunis, Egypt, Syria) with some elements of civic society developed to various degree in each case mentioned; the majority of opposition there is addressing the European political project as a goal;
n Societies dominated by the tribal structure (Lybia, Yemen) – the initial elements of civic society are being pushed aside by the tribal interests. The parties there – if exist – are merely associated with definit tribal communities. It might mean that the democratic slogans could serve as a cover for the simple replacing by the insurgents of one ruling group (tribe) by another one. In such cases we have to deal with an option of delayed political project.
n As a special model case has to be regarded the situation in Bahrain – the case of a mixt politico-religious protest. Namely, democratic slogans there are to serve mostly as a cover for political goals of the Shiit militants to overthrow the ruling Sunni minority. There are evidences that those Shiit groups are controlled and directed by Teheran.
6. There are only two cases of illegal interference on a state level into the internal troubles there – by Iran in Bahrain and Syria. In Bahrain the Iranian forces are trying to inspire and support the Shiit opposition; in Syria by contrary – to provide any support for the government to suppress the opposition by force.
7. Shiah-Sunnis. To note that in such a context the efforts of Saudis and the other Arab monarchies are of responsive (reactive, defensive) nature and are aimed at countering of the Iranian interference. Iran is openly trying to draw geopolitical favours from the ongoing Arab revolts – especially to divert world’s attention from the disputed Iranian nuk program.
8. Israel. The Arab revolts are closely and cautiously followed by Israel – especially the changes taking place in Egypt and the vagueness of the situation in Syria. To note that Israel’s concerns and interests are merely coinceding with those of the moderate Arab regimes and with Turkey to a large degree. So Israel doesn’t seem to be clearly loosing part.
9. Conclusion. The Iranian strategy to impose sensitive changes in the Arab world due to ongoing revolts seems to face limits for the time being at least. Syria remaining its important stake. The developments in Egypt, Tunis, Lybia, Bahrain and Yemen do confirm the capability of the moderate Arab regimes to manage the dangerious situations as well as to safeguard the moderate trend and vectors of the troubled countries. For this goal the Arab monarchies are ready to reconciliate with Turkey. In this context Syria seems to become more and more the driving force of eventual regional changes becoming the focus of the global rivalry between Sunnis (Saudis) and Shiits (Iran), as well as between the West (USA, Europe) and the East (Russia, China). To note that Syria is perceived in Moscow as the last Russia’s stronghold in the Middle East region.
