About the Russian decision-making regarding nuc Iran and the Arab Gulf security

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said on March, 18,  that Russia will help Iran launch its first nuclear power plant this summer, delivering a diplomatic slap to visiting U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and a blow to U.S.-led efforts to increase financial pressure on Tehran.

Mr. Putin's announcement, made at a conference on Russian's nuclear-power industry in the southern city of Volgodonsk, took Mrs. Clinton's entourage by surprise and drew a swift rebuke, wrote WSJ on March, 19. Mrs. Clinton was at that moment on a two-day visit to Moscow to work, in part, on forging a united front with Russia on addressing Iran's continuing push to develop nuclear technologies.

It is rather difficult for an analyst to deliver clear and understandable ideas about the Russia’s approach to the Iranian nuc issue. If we turn to the official Russia’s stand, so it is clear enough – bringing efforts with the aim to create a security system (SS) in the Arab Gulf region on the model of OSCE.  Let’s, however, try to go into details to show what’s behind the general official wording.

The Russia’approach to the Iran nuc problem is  inwardly contradictory what is the viable reason for the outward fluctuations of the Russia’ behavior. The visible contradiction of the Russian approach is partly explained by such an important motive like Russia’s aspiration to increase its influence in the Gulf, Arab monarchies included, springing from rather unfavourable position – namely, trying to use its special confident relations with Teheran, which Russia is obiously not going to lose. This is to explain the Russian bet on such an umbrella shape as proposed Security System in the Gulf. This situation could put in question the level of confidence Russia is seeking in the GCC arab countries. For exemple, Russian can not ignore the fact that the Executive Committee of the Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union (AIPU) has recently renewed its support to the UAE's legitimate right of regaining its three islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, occupied by Iran. The committee urged Iran to respond positively to UAE's proposals of resolving the issue through direct negotiations or by referring it to the International court of Justice. But in vain. At the same time Russia has to resist a temptation of some local actors to be involved in a game against the US to play.

What are the important factors to define Russia’s approach?

First. External factor. As Russian approach to any other Middle East problem such to Iranian issue is defined with regard to quality and current state of Russia’s relations with the USA on the global level. Let me be more precise: the Iranian issue is being regarded in Moscow mostly not as isolated and independent case, as a complex of outside challenges to Russia, but as important point of the overhelming Russian-American and to a less degree Russian-European agenda. Iran issue is being regarded as a useful tool in the process of Russia’s building relations with USA and Europe. Such a vision of the problem sometimes reminds a mechanism of trading rather than readiness to collectively meet the real challenges. The perception of Iran as source of a threat to Russia is not yet common and dominating within the Russian elite.

Secondly. The internal contradiction of the Russia’s approach is motivated by an obvious division within political elites in Moscow on this issue. We observe at least three important streams of thought vis-à-vis nuc Iran problem. Every one of them has own perceptions of the concerns regarding the Gulf region.

First of them is represented by officials and analysts directly involved into and responsible for the provision of strategic security to our country. Many of them do perceive the Iranian nuc program as potential threat to Russia. They appeal for the means to meet such a threat in advance.

Second stream of thought is being formed by the lobbying groups of a veriaty of commercial companies actually controlled by the State – the companies working in energy field, as well as arm producers and weapon sellers etc. For them the calculated and expected profits from contracts with their Iranian partners are appreciated beyond  many of strategic calculations.

At last the third stream represented by Soviet-styled people supporting an idea to cooperate with the Iranian radicals with the aim to reduce as much as possible the USA military presence in the Gulf as well as American influence over the region. They are a minority but their voices are heard.

As result we can see that all three streams of thought are taken into consideration while elaborating Russia’s approach to Iran and to the Gulf security problem. In fact the influence of the first two groups of thought is more decisive and conclusive. But the third one is not to be ignored.  

The currently dominating dispositions of the Russian leadership are the following: - to promote simultaniously the economic strategies of Russia through the mentioned companies in Iran and in the GCC area as well: - to do to minimize the risks of large scaled military explosions in the Gulf which could eventually oblige Russia to make a choice by supporting one of the belligerent sides; to impose itself as recognized mediator between the opposing sides in the Gulf – to say between Iran and GCC countries as well as Iran and the West.

All this is cleary reflected in the proposed Russian concept of establishment of an organization on security and cooperation in the Gulf area (OSCGA) which would be composed of the Gulf states, as well as Russia, USA, EC and other parties concerned with a status of observers or associated members.  

As we can see the Russian leaders speak about an organization as security framework but as a key long-term goal. This organization could form part of the regional security system of the whole Middle East. It could be achieved through a step-by step approach while interacting with all interested parties to implement constructive proposals in order to achieve a lasting security in the Gulf area. Only one citation from the official Russian concept in conclusion:

“As progress in designing a security system is achieved, discussions should be initiated on the reduction of foreign military presence in the region and on the development of common confidence-building measures between regional and other states”.